



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

THE MORAL MISSION OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOL.

CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON.

IN our scale of educational values, religious or moral training generally heads the list on paper and in theory. Even in practice, among those who appreciate and face the genuine problems, but who theorize only at close range, there exist consciously framed policies and plans for moralizing the nations through public educational measures. These latter rather than logic constitute the starting point for the present discussion. Fortunately for the purpose, we have some valuable data right at hand, the report of an international inquiry.¹ This is a report in two big volumes of nine hundred and ninety-two pages, containing in condensed form carefully prepared reports from ninety-four qualified contributors, most of them scholars of international experience and repute. At the Congress in London there were fourteen hundred in attendance; eighteen nations were represented; voices from thirty-four universities and one hundred educational organizations were heard; the sexes were about equally divided; and the tone of the conference is said to have been marked by a deeper purpose and a note of greater earnestness than that of any other of the eleven international congresses held during the same year in that metropolis. An eloquent spirit prevailed, and public opinion seemed ripe for the assimilation of the messages. The most regrettable omission seems to have been America's failure to be well represented in the debate and in the permanent record of the inquiry. The reasons for this will appear later. As one would expect, there is great difference of national and also of sectional conviction both as to how best to conceive the problem

¹ "Moral Instruction and Training in Schools." Edited by M. E. Sadler; reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XIX, No. 2.

and as to the best feasible methods for carrying out the issue involved. Most hopeful are the universally liberal disposition to learn from the experiences of others and the tendency to view the whole problem of morals and religion in education, as just now, throughout the world, in the experimental stage.

The main problems may be formulated as follows: In how far can the school utilize its 'corporate life' to promote civic loyalty and virtue? To what extent and how may the school employ methods and materials for direct moral instruction? What is the feasible policy for educational agencies to adopt as to the relation between moral and religious education?

If we accept the findings of the reported inquiry, above referred to, certain imposing conclusions are forced upon us. National educational systems are, morally, in a stage of evolution and are consciously experimenting. The school's function is more than ever that of character-making, chiefly because our modern life presents more varied and unique moral tests for every individual. The weakening of tradition, parental authority and home influence, the enrichment of knowledge and the urgency of industrial conditions have led to the social disparagement of the religious type of experience and attitude. It has come to be an actual question now whether we school men can, *in loco parentis*, so idealize for boys and girls the conceptions of 'national duty' or 'social solidarity' that such ideals may take the place of God, or religion with its more mystic element. On this profoundly critical issue, France and Japan represent the affirmative extreme; while England, English colonies, and Germany cling in different ways to a more conservative tradition. All agree that our modern social ideals are great moral assets, and that these, even if they may not supplant, must increasingly supplement traditional religious values. Granting that the school, in addition to its imperative duty of coöperating with the home, must do its moral work more systematically, its more specific practical

problem is a strictly pedagogical one. Shall moral and religious education be given separately, or together, or not at all, in our courses of study; or must we recognize them as identical, or not recognize the religious at all, but include all we aim to dispense in this connection under the caption 'moral education'? Existing national methods answer our queries variously. England is inclined to view morals and religion as, in some essential respects, interdependent, and thinks that public educational framework should provide for schools in close relation to existing religious bodies. France would appear to disregard the social right of the church to participate in the public moral education of school children. Japan would identify or fuse the alternatives of moral or religious instruction in an interesting way to be pointed out later.

Beyond this, all agree that the purely (?) religious problem, the choice of a unit basis for individual and civic ideals, must be taken from local clues and racial traits. French social duty will be built upon prevailing French social ideals, and Irish character must evolve from educational recognition of the capacities of the Irish temperament. All grant that the most potent moral factor is the personality of the teacher; that the school can use more effectively for practice in morals the corporate life of its members; that biblical literature can be better utilized for its cultural and indirect, but inevitable, moral value; that religious exercises should never be required; and that the present subjects in the curriculum could furnish more intrinsic moral values than are at present realized. The preponderating majority, despite American practice, approve of specific direct moral instruction, which shall include such topics as personal hygiene, thrift, temperance, patriotism, civic duties, and social responsibilities. Some, our own John Dewey for example, incline to the conviction that moral training does not best come through the traditional methods of instruction; in short, that there is no place in the cur-

riculum for direct moral instruction. G. S. Hall and others, however, would agree with the French and Japanese policies of placing the subject of morals in a definite, authoritative, and prominent place in the curriculum. M. E. Sadler goes even further, feeling that there are certain unassailable results that come also from purely religious instruction and ceremonies, and that some graded syllabus worked out by carefully chosen committees, subject to revision when necessary, is desirable. Lastly, everywhere also the note is strongly sounded that the teachers must be specifically and professionally equipped, so that they will realize, and be able to respond to, the urgency of this international call for moral training.

The conclusions of this important international inquiry demand that we postpone any theories as to their justice or sanity, until we have reviewed some of the data upon which the brief statements above recorded are based. To do this fairly, we should note, first, that which seems distinctive in each national method of solving the common problem. Beginning with England, we find in the public, grammar, county, municipal, private, and denominational schools, in varying degrees, emphasis laid on the conscious manipulation of the corporate life organizations of scholars, and on official moral and religious teaching. In her public schools, where most is made of corporate activity, there are good points, but also glaring deficiencies. Arnolds to run the famous Rugby system are not always to be found. The English plan seems to work best only for the born leaders. The interests developed are, after all, narrow and isolated, with no flavor of local patriotism and little connection with home; the studies are unsocial in function; and the amusements, rivalry, and consequent notoriety are unwholesome. These famous schools are, further, not in the current of the nation's life, and are not taken in hand by the nation itself. As in the day schools, parents do not understand nor enter into the work of the scholars;

and home connections at present seem but to let down the frail moral bars that are set up by school. Most of the thinkers prefer not to divorce moral and religious training, but to reinforce present methods in this combined direction. Many do not hesitate to record their faith in the efficacy of direct moral instruction, for the reason that children of the adolescent age are naturally eager to enter into the spirit of such discussions as physical and moral purity and questions of honor. They agree in the belief that the right kind of teacher can as easily lead a class in morals as one in history, literature, or art. It is for them mainly a question of the seriousness and artfulness of the teacher.

Catholics in England, as elsewhere, never divorce moral and religious education, giving about two hours a week to such work, in addition to the Three Days Retreat. Definite religious influence here is brought to bear, and moral purity is specifically aimed at. They justify with plausible psychological reasons their consciously employed method of creating for the young learner a religious, mystic atmosphere, a 'religious climate,' a feeling of reverence for the unseen, with suggestive ceremonies which incite awe and reverence. They are, therefore, on psychological grounds, opposed to non-theological, matter-of-fact moral instruction. Religious experience cannot flourish and grow on the formulas of ordinary school instruction. Purity, chastity, reverence, even school honor, must be, from our very imperfect natures, bolstered up by the impressive religious sanction. Moral facts and moral reasons, for the adolescent at least, cannot stand alone.

In England all seem to agree that girls more than boys need to cultivate corporate activity, need more than non-theological moral teaching, and should be supplied with more practical and less literary work at their pubescent period. Some advocate a combined course in housewifery and child study (parenthood), extending far beyond the customary first two months of infancy. All

here desiderate more definite knowledge of the actual stages in the evolution of the moral consciousness. Until this is worked out more fully everywhere we must proceed tentatively and very cautiously.

On the whole, as to the percentage of successes, English public schools are failures. They are too much adapted to the gifted few. Smaller classes, a definite religious atmosphere, and thoroughgoing coeducation,—as a moral not an economic issue,—are three supposed essentials; as are, also, equipment in civic responsibilities and hygienic knowledge. Physical pride and industrial skill are genuine moral props also. As to the teachers, they at present are insufficiently grounded in social ethics; and the moral function of their profession must be somehow included in their required professional equipment.

The Sunday-school movement of England assumes vast proportions, with its six hundred and ninety thousand teachers and seven million scholars. It ought to affect the early droppings from the school, but it has no standards for its materials, its methods of teaching, its system, its discipline, or its teacher qualifications, and is really thus in danger of being an anti-moral agency. The Catholic Sunday schools seek more definitely to meet the deficiencies of the public schools, utilizing desirable day-school subjects and methods. It should here be noted that in Wales the adult Sunday schools include nearly one third (seven hundred and fifty-nine thousand) of the population, though here the moral function is overshadowed by the intellectual, suffering from indefinite ethical ideals. The socialist Sunday schools show the interesting experiment of introducing myths, biography, general selected literature, folk-song, dancing, history of religions, social reforms, and evolution theories, into the subjects to be taught. In a general way, for the rest of Great Britain educationally, there are reasons to believe that the Welsh are knitting to Welsh characteristics and are courting the sterner virtues be-

sides; that Scotland is experimenting, though she is much more conservative theologically; and that Ireland suffers from a superimposed educational system not congenial to the genius of her national traditions and her unique temper.

Because of the fundamental and profound principle explicitly involved, the uniqueness of the situation, the novelty of its legal basis, and the extensive scale of its exploitation, the moral instruction policy of France is of tremendous significance and of absorbing interest. From 1833 to 1850, French laws associated religious and moral instruction. In 1882, moral and civic instruction replaced the other combination; religious instruction had to be given outside the school on a week day. The authorized moral instruction, embracing the clause 'duties to God' was at first liberally construed. In 1905, this clause disappears from the Teachers' Training Regulations. The revised statute has been in force in the secondary schools since 1902. Social solidarity is to be the revered ideal, instead of the God of theology. The State looks upon the moral mission of its public schools as august, but anti-ecclesiastical. Parents take kindly to the measure, and mainly the clergy oppose it. Here moral instruction replaces moral training, and the result is, in secondary schools, too much premature quibbling and sophistry, with little of the human relationship between teacher and student,—a characteristic of French pedagogy throughout. It is too early to pass final judgment upon this critical departure of the French schools. There is thus far a notable absence of the moral atmosphere. Pécaut, the great promoter of this plan, through his wonderful and permanent personal influence, showed what can be accomplished in this way. In the hands of his literal followers, however, it has resulted in methods which repress individuality, and which foster monotony and intellectualism of an unimaginative variety. The child, in this system, has for his moral visions no vista, no mystery, no resort to the infinite, be-

yond his pat formula. Everything is made too clear, too obvious, too matter-of-fact. As in the art instruction, the wistfulness of childhood is not fed, the children are prematurely old and *blasé* in moral affairs, and the school has yet to find its soul. Steeg, Pécaut, Fouillée, and Buisson, the leaders of thought, are not understood.

The Catholics, of course, think the scheme inadequate, see no ethical motives in the public schools, and demand a religious sanction. There is, say they, no universal human appeal in conduct save the religious; and no other policy is, for psychological and social reasons even, democratic. The child cannot replace God with formulas however reasonable. Human society, public opinion, patriotic appeals shift too capriciously to call forth the reverential attitude. They bring about jingoism, precipitate resort to the panaceas of socialism, and deprive childhood of its right to the God idea. The moral consciousness is not derived from scientific knowledge of social conditions. An echo of the social conscience is not inward morality. Spencerian agnosticism is a poor constructive moral attitude. These opponents of the state system are not slow to point to the appalling juvenile criminality of the younger generations.

The masters in the *lycées* honestly differ in their own opinions on the issue, and the keenness of the political fight further obscures the deeper genuine educational problem involved. The home fails to coöperate intelligently; the forces of teachers in the ranks have not yet absorbed the deeper conceptions of Pécaut, Buisson, and others; the made-to-order manuals in use in the moral instruction classes are not yet the best possible; and the professional training for these teachers is in the experimental stage.

So also in the moral education of French girls, the lack of a religious atmosphere and of the stimulating guidance in corporate activity is in evidence. As the

teachers are social workers, some social linkage is effected. The State's attempt to be wholly impartial has here again resulted in a failure to give due psychological and historical importance to the Jewish and Christian literatures. Again, as with boys' morals, there seems to be a presupposition that, even if one can rely on no religion, one can rely on a set philosophical or sociological basis for a moral system. Certainly it seems that the attempt is made too early to lay for the young a theoretical foundation for their morals. One can at least say with assurance that the French catechetical instruction in morals, of all subjects, is too verbal to touch the students. The very attempt at democratic liberty in morals,—a nice contrast, for the student of this problem, to England's conservatism,—would seem to have overstepped psychological limitations. Anti-religiousness, anti-ecclesiasticism, socialistic morals, emotionless worship, forced adolescent moralizing, youthful sophistry, seem in France at present to be queerly mixed. Legal decisions determine the temporary continuance of the policy, however, and the world must carefully watch the experiment, hoping that the big ideals of Pécaut and Buisson may be thoroughly tested.

Switzerland, with secondary education free to all, with healthy competition among its twenty-five free cantons, with the strong points of the German system and the absence of the German bureaucratic spirit, is a real educational laboratory. Co-education is approved, though there are too many men teachers for adolescent girls. The clergy offer some elective religious teaching in the secondary schools, while some cantons are experimenting with special moral instruction. Though the educational theory is good, Swiss practice serves still to suppress individuality, chiefly because the pedagogic methods and materials are poor. Unsectarian in principle, ready for moral instruction on a high unprejudiced plane, a lover of liberty, averse to federal encroachments

and secular quarrels, in sympathetic relation with the home influences, and with ethical training for its teachers, Switzerland's outlook for moral possibilities in its school work would seem to be very promising.

Germans provide against any educational experiment, caprice, or chance. Theirs is a safe policy, but repressive of spontaneity. Catechetical teaching extends even to her normal schools, and Herbartian methods seem over-refined. Hamburg and Bremen are free, and are instituting far-reaching school reforms, pregnant with promise and bolstered up by great popular sympathy. Among other things, these movements strike at formal religious teaching, not at the religious tone of the whole curriculum. At present, in general, instruction rather than education prevails in the empire, especially in these moral matters. Intellectual thoroughness and the ever-at-hand patriotic appeal of the fatherland are great indirect moral factors surely; but, in the opinion of many, even perfection of these sanctions cannot suffice. The continuation schools, compulsory in thirty-four of the provinces, insist upon civic and ethical as well as upon utilitarian functions. The church is, however, so powerful officially, and the State so rigorous, that the desirable free experimentation, possible in the United States, is not possible there. Many critics of the system would like to see other school forces following the lead of Hamburg and Bremen, free from numerous rigorous, limiting regulations. The teaching ranks need professional equipment in ethics, a less stilted and more moralized curriculum, and perhaps reformed or at least freer methods of instruction. Beyond this, it is a question whether systematic moral instruction would not help to focus the humane work of the school; and, with the aid of a needed journal of moral education, bring about a school atmosphere conducive to the better utilization of the corporate school life and sport. With smaller classes as a further desideratum, Germany might learn something from England in this last named measure. German girls

leave school too early, and the girls' schools are open to the criticisms above offered of boys' schools. There is still too large a proportion of men teachers on the staff of girls' high schools.

In short, Germany does not provide for good teaching of morals. The ministers and other teachers of religion are often second-rate, and have not professional training and pride. The situation in two other interesting respects is unique; Germany is not ripe for co-education, and she is said not to welcome an intimate relation between the school and the home, in this way limiting the broad social function of the former. On the whole, Germany carries us no further toward the solution of the problem of moral instruction than does France, but we have the examples, on a big scale, of two great nations, one refining ultra-conservative and dogmatic usages, the other trying out radical measures. Paulsen and other Germans prefer gradual theological emancipation in the German way to the French 'exaggeration,' thinking it safer for the school to follow rather than to lead civilization in this manner.

As one might expect, Japan has many unique and admirable features in her system of moral instruction. With highly centralized educational machinery, with her popular reverence for the continuity of the dynasty and for her ancestors, she builds upon a spiritual, almost religious, patriotic feeling toward the *Imperial Rescript* and the moral education therein implied. All religions and literatures are accommodated to this cardinal purpose. Her *KoKutai* constitute what for us would correspond to our Bible, our modern Christianity, and our constitution combined. Eternal and temporal affairs are thus merged into a personal duty to a spiritual cosmos, Japan's destiny. Pécaut of France dreamed of social solidarity molded with a reverent religious attitude into a people's everyday school worship. This is more specific, more official, and nearer actualization in Japan than in France. Loyalty can thus be assured. Secular and

religious attitudes are not severed; moral and civic duties are one. Education is compulsory and moral; ninety-five per cent. attend school; private schools do not flourish for good reasons. The State by a high standard manages the problem of text-books; the Rescript from the highest source dignifies moral education, and constitutes the material from which authoritative competent commissions compile moral instruction texts; close coöperation with the family is definitely aimed at; and, in addition, the whole course of study is moralized. In secondary schools, boys devote one, girls two hours, per week, to moral instruction; the Government syllabus allows teachers freedom; impressive moral ceremonies are arranged for stated occasions; sex problems are adapted to sex; and principles of etiquette, in the broad sense, constitute a part of the instruction. The whole system is based explicitly on the conviction that education can moralize a nation. This conclusion Japan has come to through experiments. Once all her education was moral; then came a non-moral era; with the Rescript of 1890 moral instruction was put on a specific basis; and Japanese think that this plan makes patriotism, deepens social responsibilities, affects the spirit of legislation, aids the family, and makes morality as a spiritual attitude pervasive among the people.

Finally, in regard to the situation in our own country little can be said at present. Morality in a democracy is a coat of many colors. Statistics of the varying local conditions are not at hand. State regulations, conditions, traditions, legislation, and even moral vitality are diverse. An extended census should be taken of actual prevailing opinion, in order that some inventory of profitable measures in this direction of public school work could be welded into such form as to bolster up popular support of a more definite policy. One writer sums up our obstacles as follows: municipal misgovernment, religious narrowness, and monarchical school administration and teaching.

This hurried world survey² emphasizes for us quite unequivocally the following common convictions, the sort of world policy toward which we are tending. An educational policy not permeated by the moral motive is likely to be vicious; co-education is essentially a moral issue; the home, the community, and the national tradition must be the basis upon which to build; moral aspects of education must be part of the professional equipment of all teachers; corporate activity and social traits of school children must be more specifically and can be more effectively directed; selective literature including biblical lore offers material for an elementary course in morals; the whole course of study should be considered as possessed of greater intrinsic moral possibilities; facts of sex and paidologic physiology must be squarely but delicately imparted by authorities, preferably by sex to sex; by more delicate administration the home and the school can better coöperate, particularly in this moralizing function; a more natural school life is a further desideratum; and, finally, the moral ideal must be on a plane above that of a political or purely economic issue. The deeper demands are these: that we discover with scientific assurance the actual stages in moral development and perception through which the growing child inevitably passes; and that we acquire, especially in the different States of our country, a knowledge of the status of professional educational opinion now existing and prevailing in regard to definite moral education. In addition, we have noted remarkable unanimity in the view that national, even human society, is itself still in the process of moral evolution, and that this common prag-

² Various other unique national aspects of the problem and methods for its solution might be shown if one could, even cursorily, suggest the prominent features in Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, in the different provinces of Canada and of Australia, and in the youngest New Zealand democracy. Some institutions in our country, notably the Ethical Culture School of New York, the Hyannis Normal School of Massachusetts, and others are likewise exploiting various methods of approach to the same problem.

matic conviction of the evolution of the moral law must give the clue as to the moral measures the schools of any nation shall adopt. Thus, only by building upon the child's endowment, racial, social, and individual, of instincts and symbolic cravings for objective ideals, and by idealizing the State as *par excellence* a moral institution, though not an ecclesiastical one, may the school find its fuller social justification.

The French system seems to base its reliance upon some existing philosophy, the English upon some presupposed serviceable and reliable theological conception of God. The one is perhaps in the end as dogmatic as the other. Our problem is, which hypothesis or what other workable formula will really furnish the most powerful and universal moral appeal. Paulsen, from sociological as well as practical reasons, would not have Germany attempt to follow France. Höffding says that religions represent the best means for the conservation of the finest human values. If this is true, that there is a law of the conservation of values, some definite articulation of our schools with these developing religious bodies and doctrines and attitudes would seem a natural social demand. The French way would tend to rest in public opinion's intellectual appraisal of temporary values, to be, therefore, lacking in true evolutionary momentum and perspective, and to issue in a temporizing sort of worship. The more conservative policy of keeping in touch with existing religious agencies would seem to give the school steady security. In a democracy, at all events, school ideas and ideals cannot safely ignore prevailing religious belief. School morals and church religion must develop interdependently. Sanity, candor, fairness, and tact will establish, despite creeds, the needed coöperation.

If our facts, above recorded, are correct, we have a genuine pragmatic test of religious theoretical opinion. The various national attitudes have resulted in actual school policies. We inherit the status just as it is. What

to make out of it, is the practical problem. The smaller countries, with their specific unique developments, offer us surprising lessons. Their old historical and literary traditions are moral to the core; Denmark, Norway, and Japan can more easily make patriotism definitely moral and even religious than can we of a traditionally dis-united and heterogeneously populated country.

Again, there is perhaps too much talk of the moral value of the course of study, in the superficial sense that this is an element to be added as an accretion to the primary purpose of the subject of study in question. If a subject has religious or moral value, it has it intrinsically, and genuine teaching will bring it out. The real question for the school is the practical one of whether we can hasten wisely the process of moralizing the scholars by a more differentiated curriculum, adding specific moral instruction. Ideally, the course of study should do everything for the child. In our actual situation, however, we have too few effective moral influences. Are we liable to bungle matters and deaden, rather than enliven, the moral sense by directly and officially recognizing and establishing a course in morals for our public schools? It is absurd again to say this cannot be done. It has been done in thousands of good homes; there are conspicuous examples of its success in public schools. Non-theological moral instruction should be adapted, of course, to social needs. It is a question simply of the degree of seriousness, judiciousness, and liberality of the ranks of teachers and of educational leaders. As with art in our curricula, it may well be that we as a nation are not yet sufficiently eager for social moral insight to create a telling demand for teachers who can convey moral truths delicately and yet directly. Intellectualism, the easiest deduction from Herbartian philosophy, with us as with Germany, and Spencer's salvation through scientific fact alone, powerful with us as with France, have effectually, for too long, obscured some of the finer aspects of the educative process. The so-called inci-

dental culture of moral insight as of art appreciation is, in certain stages of development, a poor, spineless policy.

Again, college students, prospective and actual teachers in the public schools, confuse a religious attitude with a philosophy of religion. Such teachers are in the air themselves. They should be helped to sanity in this matter. Through their professional study in educational departments, through the regular courses, and, when feasible, through courses especially designed for treating the specific subject of juvenile morality, through the corporate life of the school, and through definitely planned personal contacts, they would quickly make moral insight the supreme end and the pervading tone of all public school work.

We are now striving to consider our relation to this actual social world of ours, as honestly and with as much faith and spirit, as we have learned to look upon inanimate nature. Before we, refining the spirit of Rousseau, learned to love nature as she is, to love her stupidity, her unresponsiveness, her massiveness, her mysterious air, her hidden and never more than half revealed meaning,—until this time we placed our educational hopes in mysterious processes, in forced faiths. Naturalism was a great step toward actuality under everyday guise. It meant that educators might use some of the resources of everyday environment. It meant, not that lifeless objects took the place of a living God, as the unimaginative and pessimistic would have it, but that we needed the nature symbol for an ever-present, ever-needed instrumentality to satisfy, even by a figure, some deep inner human craving. This is the truth at the bottom of all science of nature, and all school education founded on it. Now, despite Spencer's attempted sidetrack, science teaching alone is better than former religious teaching alone, simply because it is a better utilization of environment. But there is another possible step in advance. Nature is, even in the big sense above, not all

of environment; the human element must be added. Environment in school now includes the social element also. Wordsworth did partly 'speak arrant nonsense,' as did Rousseau, as to the possibilities of vernal woods. The child must be inducted, as well, into social life by some sort of reproduced social activity. This is democracy. This is the public school's mission, morally, æsthetically, religiously. An understanding of modern complex social and industrial environment, with hygienic insight, idealized, will surely largely constitute our moral equipment. Higher sanctions than these, our faith in the conservation and even evolution of life's deeper values, will in due course be revealed in this vast social process whose central moving force should be the people's schools.

CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

RELIGION: A LUXURY OR A DUTY?

NORMAN WILDE.

TO ask whether religion is a luxury or a duty, is to ask whether it is one of those desirable comforts which may be, indeed, a help to right living though not of its essence, or whether it is so identified with the fundamentals of life that to lack it is to be incompletely human. To-day there seem unmistakable tendencies toward the defense of religion as one of the luxuries of life, as the most significant of all poetic ideas and practices, as that which adds the touch of beauty to a world otherwise hard and barren. Its æsthetic value is urged as its justification, instead of its theoretical truth. To lose it would be to lose the charm of life. The irreligious man is not a moral pervert, but an æsthetic defective whose lack is to be deplored but not condemned. Or it may be its personal pleasure to which attention is di-